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“It takes two to make a thing go right”: The coevolution of technological and 
mathematical tools in neuroscience 
 
Abstract 
Some philosophers of neuroscience have recently argued that the history of 
neuroscience is principally a history of technological tool development. Across 
these claims, there is little to no mention of data analysis methods nor their 
underlying assumptions. Here, I argue that mathematical tools have played crucial 
roles in the history of neuroscience. First, I present the Hodgkin-Huxley model as 
an example of research constrained by technological limitations and mathematical 
assumptions. Second, I highlight scale-free neuronal dynamics and explain how 
that discovery required both technological and mathematical advancements. I 
conclude by discussing consequences for explanations in neuroscience. 
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It takes two to make a thing go right. 
—Rob Base (Ginyard) and DJ E-Z Rock (Bryce), It takes two 
 
1. Introduction 
There should be no doubt that technological developments have played 
significant roles throughout the history of scientific discoveries and progress. This 
is as true in the physical sciences (e.g., particle accelerators in physics) as in the 
life sciences (e.g., microscopes in biology). What is less apparent is the role 
mathematical developments have played in facilitating and supporting many of 
those discoveries. Mathematical tools for analyzing data may not be at the 
forefront of discoveries centering on the physical structure of investigative targets 
of interest (e.g., cells); but they certainly are crucial in research focused on the 
dynamics of phenomena (e.g., planetary motion). In short, for science to progress, 
research on the movement and temporal aspects of phenomena often require the 
coevolution of technological and mathematical tools. 
Recently, it has been increasingly argued by some philosophers of 
neuroscience that experimental tools are not just important but are fundamental to 
neuroscience research (e.g., Bickle, 2016). Put in its most extreme terms, the line 
of thought goes like this: From Golgi’s staining technique to functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, and from deep brain stimulation to optogenetics, the history 
of neuroscience is principally a history of tool development. Moreover, it has 
been argued that this history is best characterized as one that exhibits reductionist 
(Bickle, 2006, 2016) and mechanistic explanations (Craver, 2002, 2005). Across 
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these claims, little to no mention of data analysis methods are mentioned nor the 
underlying assumptions of those methods. Here, I argue that the mathematical 
assumptions of applied data analyses have played crucial roles in the history of 
neuroscience. First, I present the Hodgkin and Huxley model of action potentials 
as an example of research constrained by technological and mathematical 
limitations of the time. Second, I draw attention to a feature of neurons that is 
overlooked by the Hodgkin-Huxley model: scale-free dynamics. After describing 
scale-free dynamics, I then point out a consequence scale-free neuronal dynamics 
has for mechanistic explanations of neuronal activity. I conclude by discussing the 
necessity of mathematical developments in providing appropriate accounts of 
scale-free neuronal activity. 
 
2. Hodgkin-Huxley model and scale-free neuronal dynamics 
The canonical Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) model of action potentials in 
the squid giant axon is considered “the single most successful quantitative model 
in neuroscience” (Koch, 1999, p. 171). The majority of the details of the model 
are not essential for my current aims. For detailed explanations of this model see 
Gerstner, Kistler, Naud, and Paninski (2014), as well as Koch (1999) for 
discussion and further references. For now, it is important to understand that this 
model treats the action potential as an event that is “all-or-none” in that it occurs 
within distinctly defined timescales (e.g., ; Bear et al., 2016; Figure 1). Moreover, 
those timescales have a lower boundary, specifically, 10 milliseconds (ms) in the 
canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model (Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952, p. 528; Koch, 1999, 
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p. 334; Marom, 2010, p. 23). What that means is that the action potential of a 
neuron (i.e., its “spike” of activity) is treated within the Hodgkin-Huxley model as 
occurring at least 10 ms from initiation to termination of all involved processes 
(Marom, 2010, p. 22). 
 
Figure 1. Hodgkin-Huxley model. (a) The canonical Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) 
model of action potentials in the squid giant axon. (b) Definitions of key model 
variables. (c) The basic shape of an action potential as produced by Hodgkin-
Huxley model. (Modified and reprinted with permission from Wikipedia. CC BY-
SA 4.0.) The x-axis captures the entire range of time in which an action potential 
occurs. According to the model, the lower temporal boundary of an action 
potential is 10 ms. This means that the entire event, from start to finish, occurs 
within that time frame. 
 
As is well-known (e.g., Marom, 2010), although there were empirically 
justifiable reasons at the time (e.g., Adrian & Zotterman, 1926), defining the 
“action potential” as a 10 ms event was due to investigator observational 
preferences in combination with technological limitations. Observational 
preferences were constrained by the limits of the recording technology, namely, 
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the voltage clamp. Although the voltage clamp was instrumental in providing the 
data that lead to the development of the Hodgkin-Huxley model, it was limited in 
its ability to record the full range of ion channels, charged particles, and other 
physiologically relevant features of neuronal activity (Schwiening, 2012). This 
resulted in the need to sum across molecular activity (Gerstner et al., 2014)—
certainly a necessity when calculating at the molecular scale—and collapse other 
physiological features into imprecise “leak” terms, a sort of “catch all” variable 
used in models that have causally relevant features that have not been precisely 
measured. Other limitations involved the manner in which the data was 
calculated. Hodgkin and Huxley calculated data from the voltage clamp via hand 
calculators (Koch, 1999, p. 160). Specifically, Hodgkin and Huxley utilized a 
mechanical calculator, the Brunsviga 20 (Figure 2), which required them to spend 
a few weeks and many thousands of rotations of the mechanical calculator’s crank 
(Schwiening, 2012). 
 
Figure 2. The Brunsviga 20, “one of the most popular mechanical calculators. It 
was produced up to the early 1970s and marketed with the slogan ‘Brains of 
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Steel’” (Schwiening, 2012). (Reprinted with permission from Wikipedia. CC BY-
SA 2.0 DE). 
 
Although the canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model is described by some as 
being linear in nature (e.g., Gerstner et al., 2014; Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952, pp. 
538-540), there is debate about whether or not it is able to capture the relevant 
types of nonlinearities exhibited by feedback that are now established as 
occurring during action potentials (e.g., Marom, 2010; Schwiening, 2012). 
Regardless whether or not the canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model is linear or 
nonlinear, or can capture particular forms of feedback, it is clear now that even 
single neurons are appropriately understood as nonlinear systems (e.g., 
Izhikevich, 2007). 
Advancements in recording technologies have facilitated the ability of 
neuroscientists to obtain more detailed data on neuronal activity (e.g., 
multielectrode arrays; Gross, 2011), making it possible to record more detailed 
and accurate data from longer timescales of neuron activity. As a result, it is 
becoming increasingly evident that the relevant timescales for explaining even 
“basic” single-neuron activity requires looking below and above that 10 ms 
window. Action potentials do not appear to have strictly defined windows of 
activity, specifically, nonlinearities in the forms of feedback and hysteresis 
significantly contribute to the event. Instead of viewing action potentials as 
having clear startup and finish conditions (Figure 1), it is more accurate to view 
action potentials as continuous, nonlinear cycles. This is clearly depicted in early 
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models, such as the FitzHugh-Nagumo model (FitzHugh, 1961; Nagumo et al., 
1962; Figure 3a) and more recent models, such as the Izhikevich model 
(Izhikevich, 2007; Figure 3b). 
 
Figure 3. Models of single-neuron activity. (a) FitzHugh-Nagumo model and 
phase space portrait. (Modified and reprinted with permission from Scholarpedia. 
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.) (b) Izhikevich model and phase space portrait. (Modified 
with permission from J. Terwilliger, 2018.) 
 
As mentioned above, there is debate as to the degree or not that the 
canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model accounts for a wide range of nonlinear features 
of action potentials, such as hysteresis. I am not entering that debate here. Instead, 
I focus on a particularly notable recent finding that has resulted from improved 
recording technologies. That finding is the apparently scale-free nature of 
neuronal activity. At its most general, a phenomenon is “scale-free” (or “scale 
invariant”) when its structure (i.e., behavioral, spatial, and/or temporal) is 
statistically self-similar from various points of observation (Bak, 1996; Gisiger, 
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2001). Many illustrative examples of spatial scale-free structures are found in 
fractal geometry (Mandelbrot, 1983; Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Koch triangle is an example of a spatial fractal. Here, three 
iterations of self-similarity are depicted (a,b,c). (Modified and reprinted with 
permission from Wikipedia. CC BY-SA 3.0.) 
 
Scale-free properties have become particularly popular in recent years in 
regard to network structure, where few nodes have many connections and many 
nodes have few connections. Consequently, such networks have no specific or 
average number of connections that characterize the entire system. 
Mathematically speaking, scale free structures can be characterized by their 
power-law distribution (He, 2014). It has become commonly accepted that many 
phenomena and systems of diverse composition are scale free in this way, for 
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example, cellular metabolism, Hollywood actors that have worked together, 
sexual relationships, and the World Wide Web (Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003). 
There is increasing evidence that neural systems exhibit many scale-free 
properties (e.g., Boonstra et al., 2013; He, 2014). These properties are exhibited 
from neuronal network connections to neuron branching patterns. For current 
purposes, I focus on the scale-free dynamics exhibited by neuronal dynamics (for 
a wide range of examples see Boonstra et al., 2013). In short, neuronal dynamics 
are considered “scale free” when there is no single time scale that properly 
characterizes its activity, which includes attempting to define an event as 
occurring within specific windows of time. There are a number of consequences 
that result from the fact that many neural systems exhibit scale-free spatial or 
temporal structure. In the next section I explore one such consequence, 
specifically, the inability of mechanistic explanations to account for scale-free 
neuronal dynamics.  
 
3. Consequences of scale-free dynamics for explanations in neuroscience 
In a recent paper, Bechtel (2015) argues against the claim that scale-free 
biological phenomena cannot be explained mechanistically. He rejects the 
following argument, which I summarize as follows: 
1. Mechanistic explanations require that the phenomena being explained 
have well-defined boundaries, such as a temporal boundary. 
2. Many biological phenomena exhibit scale-free features. 
3. Scale-free phenomena have no well-defined temporal boundaries. 
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4. Therefore, scale-free biological phenomena cannot be explained 
mechanistically. 
Marom (2010) presents such an argument and serves as one of Bechtel’s targets. 
Marom argues that there is empirical evidence suggesting that neuronal activity is 
scale-free and, thus, is just the type of biological phenomenon that cannot be 
explained mechanistically. Marom’s argument includes discussion of the 
Hodgkin-Huxley model, which leads him to conclude: 
Indeed, the lesson from our journey across levels of organization, 
from behavior through neural assemblies to single neurons and 
proteins, suggests that dreams on all-encompassing microscopic 
timescale-based descriptions, aimed at explaining the temporal 
richness of macroscopic levels, should be abandoned. Other 
approaches are called for. (2010, p. 23) 
In short, Marom claims that there are no uniquely defined timescales that could 
justify defining action potentials as events that have a lower boundary of 10 ms. 
Consequently, macroscale neuronal activity that appear scale-free are not merely 
the result of additive or linear combinations of microscale contributions. Instead, 
they are truly scale-free: the micro timescales contribute to and constrain the 
macro timescales, but so too does the macro contribute to and constrain the micro, 
such that no single scale serves a more fundamental explanatory role than the 
others. 
Bechtel’s reply to Marom is that scale-free phenomena can still be 
explained mechanistically. But to do so requires that we appreciate the role of 
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mechanisms in scientific practice. According to Bechtel, scientists often posit 
“bounded mechanisms” for the purposes of testing hypotheses (2015, pp. 84-85). 
A scientist can understand that a phenomenon is interconnected (e.g., networks) 
and still pursue a mechanistic account of that phenomenon by drawing boundaries 
around that organism. Those bounded mechanisms are not abstractions, however. 
“Abstractions,” according to Bechtel, leave information out. Instead, those 
bounded mechanisms are idealizations. Idealizations, according to Bechtel, are 
models with simplifying falsehoods (2015, p. 85). For example, if phenomenon X 
is understood to be highly interconnected, an explanation of X that assumes that it 
is not affected by all of those connections would be an abstraction. But to localize 
X to, for example, its nearest neighbors, is to provide a “first approximation” 
(2015, p. 85; italics in original) that appreciates the practical challenges of 
accounting for all the actual connections. Such an explanation would be both an 
idealization and a mechanism. 
Although he accepts that neuronal dynamics can be scale-free, Bechtel 
remains committed to providing mechanistic explanations of those dynamics. 
Accordingly, Bechtel remains committed to mechanisms being bounded, on the 
further stipulation that such bounded mechanisms are idealizations and not 
abstractions. For example, the action potential is a “bounded mechanism” that 
occurs within 10 ms windows. Such an idealization is acceptable because it makes 
the timescales of that phenomenon tractable to investigators’ cognitive limitations 
(2015, p. 92). Thus, the Hodgkin-Huxley model can be understood as an 
idealization of action potentials, with the 10 ms feature being a simplifying 
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falsehood—though not an abstraction that leaves out relevant features. This is a 
very streamlined presentation of Bechtel’s argument, for example, he makes a 
further claim that such idealized mechanisms can point out areas for further 
investigation in a mechanistic explanation. What matters for my current purposes, 
is Bechtel’s attempt to make room within mechanistic accounts to explain scale-
free activity. 
There is a lot in Bechtel’s reply to Marom to agree with, for example, the 
fact that scientists are epistemically-limited creatures who need to simplify some 
phenomena in order to get an intellectual grip on them. However, I think 
Bechtel’s reply overlooks a central issue raised by Marom. If mechanisms are, by 
definition, bounded, then scale-free phenomena (e.g., scale-invariant, fractal, 
flicker noise, power laws, etc.; Gisiger, 2001) are, by definition, not mechanisms. 
In the case of action potentials, the canonical Hodgkin-Huxley model sets a lower 
boundary on the phenomenon at 10 ms. In other words, it treats action potentials 
as starting and finishing within windows of time of at least 10 ms (Figure 1c). As 
discussed above, such a claim was justified as being consistent with the best 
science of the time (e.g., Adrian & Zotterman, 1926). With that said, it was 
constrained by technological (voltage clamp) and mathematical (the type of 
calculations that could be conducted on a Brunsviga 20 calculator; Figure 2) 
limitations. Technological advancements have certainly played a role in revealing 
scale-free dynamics (e.g., multielectrode arrays; Gross, 2011). However, data 
from advanced equipment alone has not justified the existence of scale-free 
dynamics in neuronal systems. The other part needed for the right account—
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remember, “it takes two to make a thing go right”—is the pairing of data from 
suitable technology with the appropriate mathematical tools. 
In the case of single-neuron activity, the right mathematical tools are those 
from nonlinear dynamical systems theory (NDST; e.g., Izhikevich, 2007; 
Liebovitch & Toth, 1990). NDST methods are crucial to assessing scale-free 
structure, and can contribute to establishing whether a phenomenon is truly scale-
free or not and, if so, what kind of scale-free characteristics it has. What’s more, 
applying NDST methods to complex and nonlinear phenomena typically requires 
powerful computers. For example, generating phase portraits of relatively simple 
two-dimensional dynamical systems was often not practical before computers. 
Hodgkin and Huxley’s “Brains of Steel” mechanical calculator was certainly not 
up to the task. Thus, the Izhikevich model of single-neuron activity required both 
the appropriate processing power (i.e., modern computers) and data analysis 
methods (i.e., NDST) in order to provide qualitative and quantitative accounts of 
that phenomenon’s nonlinear dynamics. 
As mentioned above, nonlinear dynamics are not central to my current 
aims; but scale-free dynamics are. Scale-free properties are a particularly unique 
set of phenomena in regard to the need for coevolved technological and 
mathematical tools. Many aspects of mammalian biological phenomena alone 
exhibit scale-free structures, such as, bronchial tube branching, eye saccades, 
heart beats, neuronal networks, and postural sway. Accordingly, different 
mathematical tools are needed to properly determine the ways they are scale-free. 
For example, detrended fluctuation analysis (Peng et al., 1994) can assess 
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structural self-similarity in a signal, but will not necessarily make clear if the 
structure results from linear or nonlinear processes (Bryce & Sprague, 2012). In 
the case of appropriate mathematical methods for assessing the scale-free 
dynamics of action potentials, if such activity is, for example, fractal, then it 
would not have been possible to accurately analyze such data, regardless of 
technological advancements, until the 1980s. The reason is because the concept 
“fractals” was not introduced to the broader scientific community until then 
(Mandelbrot, 1983). 
In order to identify fractal scale-free structures, whether resulting from 
linear or nonlinear processes, the concept “fractals” and their measurement must 
be part of an investigators toolbox. Fractals, such as the Koch triangle (Figure 4) 
are paradigm examples of scale invariance: the overall structure of the system is 
maintained at each level of observation. Such phenomena are thus not 
appropriately explained in terms that, for example, treat them as having an 
average value. Instead, as Mandelbrot pointed out, such phenomena are 
appropriately characterized via a fractal dimension. The fractal dimension 
provides a quantitative means of characterizing a scale-free phenomenon that 
accounts for all of its scales. The equation for calculating the fractal dimension is: 𝑛 = 1 𝑆!%  
Let’s go back to the Koch triangle. For demonstration purposes, we will 
look at a four-lined Koch triangle (Figure 4). Here n is the number of line 
segments at a particular scale of observation; in this case, it is 4. Next, S is the 
scale factor, or the size reduction at each iteration; here it is 1/3. Our equation is 
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now: 4 = 1/(1/3)d, or 4 = 3d. We want to figure out d, or the fractal dimension. To 
do so, we take the log of both sides: d = log 4/log 3, which gives us a fractal 
dimension d = 1.26. In English, this means that the fractal dimension of the Koch 
triangle is 1.26, which means it is not a straight line (1) or a square (2), but closer 
to being a straight line than a square (1.26). There are various other methods for 
mathematically assessing fractals and multifractals (Lopes & Betrouni, 2009). 
The point of this example is to demonstrate that before Mandelbrot’s 
invention (discover?) of fractal geometry, it was not possible to accurately 
account for such phenomena, for example, collapsing scale-invariant structures 
into single values (e.g., arithmetic mean). The consequence for neuronal activity 
is that it was not until the 1990s (e.g., Liebovitch & Toth, 1990) that scale-free 
dynamics could be properly identified. Before then, such properties were 
misidentified via other statistical methods. Since scale-free structures have no 
primary scale or average scale, they have no specific window to identify as the 
start and finish boundary. Such a view of neuronal activity is further evidenced by 
other NDST-based work, such as the Izhikevich model (2007; Figure 3b), which 
treats action potentials as continuous cycles and not “all-or-none” (cf. Figure 1c). 
If true, that is, if action potentials are not bounded within discrete windows of 
time, then action potentials cannot be accounted for mechanistically. 
In concluding this section, an important clarification needs to be made in 
order to address a significant critique of the current line of thought. The critique 
centers on the notion of “bounded” in regard to natural phenomena. As discussed 
above, the currently-relevant aspect of the Bechtel/Marom debate centers on the 
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idea that mechanistic explanations treat targets of investigation as bounded, 
namely, as having delineated borders, which can be spatial or temporal. The 
Hodgkin-Huxley model of action potentials and its 10 ms event window were 
presented as an example of such a bounded mechanism. Scale-free neuronal 
dynamics was presented as an unbounded phenomenon, which means it is not a 
phenomenon accessible to mechanistic explanation (i.e., if “mechanistic 
explanations” include the stipulation of boundedness; see Bechtel, 2015 and 
Marom, 2010). The critique of this line of thought centers on the point that even 
scale-free neuronal dynamics are “bounded” in a number of ways, for example, 
there is a window of time in which they occur (e.g., they do not last for months, 
years, or centuries) and they are spatially confined (e.g., they occur in an area of 
the brain, and not across the whole brain, let alone body). This is a compelling 
critique. However, it does not address the way in which scale-free dynamics are 
“unbounded.” The way in which scale-free dynamics are unbounded concerns the 
inability of single, bounded values to characterize the phenomenon. A time series 
(Figure 5) need not be infinite nor recorded from an event that has no spatial 
location in order to be scale free. A scale-free time series exhibits the same 
pattern among windows of various lengths of time. For example, if a heartbeat 
shows a pattern of activity over 60 minutes, then, to be considered scale-free, that 
same pattern should be shown in each of two 30 minute windows of time, at each 
of four 15 minute windows, and so on. In that way, the time series is not properly 
understood as “bounded” in that there is no single length of time that 
characterizes the entire signal. That is to say, it is not correct to treat the event as a 
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bounded 60 minute event, or a 30 minute event, and so on; but in terms of the 
structure of the patterns across various scales. It is in that sense that Marom 
argues that neuronal dynamics do not have timescales, and it is in that sense that 
they are unbounded, and, thus, not properly explained mechanistically. 
 
Figure 5. Fractal time series exhibiting scale-free structure at various windows of 
time. (Reproduced with permission from Armentano et al., 2017. CC BY 3.0.) 
 
4. Conclusion 
It is highly unlikely to find disagreement among the scientific research 
community at large that technological advancements have paved the way for 
some of the greatest advances and discoveries. What is less often 
acknowledged—especially in neuroscience—is the necessity of coevolving our 
mathematical tools with technological advances, and vice versa. Consequently, 
technological advancements that produce more detailed and accurate data 
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recording will not alone necessarily provide proper explanations of biological 
phenomena. Mathematical tools like those provided by NDST are needed as well 
in order to properly characterize data. The Hodgkin-Huxley model was informed 
and constrained by the available technological (i.e., voltage clamp) and 
mathematical (i.e., Brunsviga 20 calculator) tools of the time. Since then, more 
advanced technology (e.g., multielectrode arrays) and mathematics (e.g., fractal 
analysis) have highlighted some of the shortcoming of the Hodgkin-Huxley model 
as a comprehensive model of action potentials across temporal scales. Scale-free 
neuronal activity provides a rich example of this. In order to identify scale-free 
activity, researchers needed more accurate measurements, data analyses, and—in 
this case—new concepts altogether. In order to properly account for scale-free 
activity, a new concept—namely, fractals and the fractal dimension—was needed, 
as was accompanying innovative mathematical analyses. One consequence of the 
existence of scale-free neuronal activity discussed here involves the limitations of 
mechanistic explanations to account for phenomena that are without discrete 
temporal boundaries. In sum, an attempt has been made here to demonstrate that it 
takes two to make progress in neuroscience, namely, both technological and 
mathematical advancements. 
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